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 Shouyong Shi(1998) presents a general equilibrium model which shows a persistent 
monetary propagation mechanism. There the high persistence is obtained by a combination of 
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Labor market frictions are not crucial but prolong the output responses and reduce their 
magnitude. 
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1 Introduction
The analysis of monetary economies is mostly undertaken in the framework
of dynamic general equilibrium models with Walrasian goods markets. With
Walrasian markets there is no role for money as a means of exchange, since
all transactions take place in a centralized market place. Intrinsically value-
less money can serve as a numeraire and a store of value, but is dominated
in return by interest earning assets, so additional assumptions have to be
made to let agents hold money in equilibrium. To introduce money in a
Walrasian model mainly three assumptions are used. First, in the money-in-
the-utility-function (MIUF) models agents derive direct utility from holding
money.1 Literally this could be the pleasure of counting one’s money. But
one can also interpret this utility as the transaction services derived from the
durable good ‘money balances’. Second, money-in-the-production-function
(MIPF) models assume that the transaction services of money improve the
production process.2 Finally, a more direct way to model the role of money
in transactions is to assume that agents have to hold cash-in-advance (CIA)
to be able to buy at least some goods.3 All these approaches are short-cuts
that avoid the modelling of the role of money as means of exchange from first
principles and share the feature that money is not essential.4
There exist other approaches that restrict the participation in otherwise
Walrasian markets and generate thereby the need for a means of exchange. In
the overlapping generations model of Samuelson[21] young agents can meet
old agents to trade, but their potential trading partners when old are not
born yet. Hence there arises the need of a store of value that can be used
to be exchanged for goods when agents are old. However, if other tradable
assets exist, money looses its role as means of exchange. Another drawback
is that money is used in exchange only twice in a lifetime of an agent which
is quite different from what we observe in reality. The turnpike model of
1Most models in the New Keynesian Macroeconomics literature use this approach. See,
e.g., the Handbook article of Rotemberg and Woodford[18] for an overview.
2See e.g. Benhabib and Farmer[1] for an application. There money in the production
function can lead to indeterminacy of equilibria even if the effect of money in production is
assumed small. They argue that their flexible prices model with indeterminacy can mimic
the behaviour of sticky prices models.
3The Limited-Participation models following Fuerst[7], [8] are commonly based on the
assumption of a CIA constraint.
4Essentiality means that some of the allocations achievable in a monetary equilibrium
cannot be achieved in an equilibrium without money.
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Townsend[26] does not have this unpleasant feature. There, people have
altering endowments over time and are spatially separated on a turnpike
moving in opposite directions from one trading post to another. Money
here also serves as medium of intertemporal exchange, although on a shorter
time horizon. Both approaches set up an environment that gives money in
principle an essential role5. However, they do not capture the role of money
as a medium of exchange in overcoming the problems of an ‘absence of a
double coincidence of wants’ or of ‘indivisibilities’. The first problem raised
by Jevons[10] is characterized by a situation where, say, agent A likes the
good of agent B but not vice versa. The second problem arises if the two
different goods to exchange are indivisible but differ in value, for example an
exchange of 1 cow for a pair of shoes, so direct barter is not possible, either.
The search-theoretic monetary models of Kiyotaki and Wright[11],[12]
and the following literature based on this approach set up an environment
where money eases bilateral trade exactly in these dimensions.6 Typically, a
medium of exchange arises endogenously in these models. This can in princi-
ple be either ‘commodity money’7 or intrinsically useless ‘fiat money’, or both.
Under certain parametrizations ‘fiat money’ gets valuable. In this literature
it is mostly assumed that agents are matched randomly with each other.8
In this case there cannot be commitment because agents will most probably
not meet again. This rules out credit as a means of payment. If additionally
agents have no memory or only partial memory about other agents’ trans-
action histories society cannot enforce an equilibrium where agents always
produce for others. Under these circumstances there exist only insufficient
‘trigger strategies’ to punish agents who refuse to produce for others, and
hence money gets essential.9
5Alternative approaches where money is modelled in a way such that it becomes es-
sential are among others: the trading-post models of Shubik[23],[24] and the asymmetric
information model of Levine[14].
6See for example Rupert et al.[19], chapter 4, for an extensive overview over the liter-
ature based on the search-theoretic approach.
7If the farmer in the above example accepts 10 pairs of shoes for a cow although he
needs only one pair - hoping to be able to exchange later the other pairs of shoes into
other goods he likes - then shoes are used as a medium of exchange. If they are accepted
widely as a medium of exchange they form a kind of ‘commodity money’.
8Corbae, Temzelides and Wright[4] study models with endogeneous choice of trading
partners instead of random matching. Also there a double-coincidence of wants problem
creates a role for money, as long as agents are restricted to one bilateral trade per period.
9Kocherlakota[13] establishes that necessary conditions for the essentiality of money
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Because this literature models the role of money as a means of exchange
in an explicit way it provides a reasonable micro-foundation of money. Un-
fortunately, there is a high degree of heterogeneity of agents in these models:
the pairwise exchange of goods in a random matching framework generates
non-degenerate distributions of goods inventories and money holdings. The
difficulty of keeping track of these distributions is usually overcome by mak-
ing strong assumptions in order to limit the state space.10 These, in turn,
inhibit the examination of the effects of a constant rate of money creation
and shocks to the money growth rate.
Shi[22] is the first successful attempt to study the monetary propagation
mechanism of a monetary policy shock in a search-theoretic monetary model.
He overcomes the problem of heterogeneity by using the assumption that the
decision making unit - the household - is itself a continuum of agents. Hence,
idiosyncratic risk is fully insured and a representative agent formulation can
be used.11 In addition, Shi’s[22] model incorporates inventory holdings and
labor-search.
In spite of the absence of a propagation mechanism due to capital accu-
mulation Shi’s[22] model features a highly persistent employment reaction
to a monetary shock. The propagation of a positive monetary shock in this
model can be summarized as follows: An increase in the money supply re-
duces the shadow value of money and hence the value of wages and sales.
This alone would cause a reduction in labor supply and labor demand and
therefore employment and output. This is the conventional ‘expected infla-
tion effect’. However, there is a ‘search-enhancing effect’ that works in the
opposite direction: the falling shadow value of holding money makes search
are lack of complete memory and that agents cannot commit to future actions.
10The strongest assumption - present in the very first papers of this literature - is that
agents can only hold one unit of goods or one unit of money. The following literature
relaxed this assumption gradually, but still money holdings have to be either one unit or
bounded above by a fixed number.
11Faig[6] uses a different interpretation for the same modelling device: the continuum
of agents do not form a household but a village. Within a village people know each other
and their respective trading histories, so credit and insurance contracts among villagers
can be used to face idiosyncratic risk of the agents.
Recently Lagos and Wright [25] used a different modelling device to generate a degen-
erate distribution of money holdings. After decentralized trade for specialized goods a
centralized market opens where agents trade for a general good in order to adjust their
money balances. With quasi-linear preferences in one of the goods traded in the centralized
market this implies that all agents end up with the same money holdings.
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more profitable since a higher search intensity increases the probability of a
suitable match where the now less valuable money can be exchanged for con-
sumption goods. In other words, buyers spend more shoe-leather to get rid
of the less valuable money. Hence, less unsold goods remain as inventories for
next period. The reduction in goods supply, in turn, lets buyers search more
intensively in the subsequent period, too. Thus, the search-enhancing effect
induces an ‘inventory effect’ which in turn reinforces the search-enhancing
effect. This feedback triggers a high demand for labor in subsequent periods
and is stronger than the opposing inflation effect.
The first goal of this paper is to examine the model’s overall sensitivity
to parameter changes. To do this, a global sensitivity analysis is performed
by following the calibration procedure in Canova[2],[3] to calibrate each pa-
rameter of the model to an interval. The results of this exercise indicate that
the model is quite robust to parameter changes.
The second goal is to isolate the effects of the key elements of this com-
plex model: goods-search (S), inventory holdings (I) and labor-search (L).
Rather than looking at the effects of parametrizations where, for example,
the model features almost no holdings of inventories because they depreciate
at a high rate, I formulate variations of the model which explicitly aban-
don one or more of the elements each. A pairwise comparison of the model
equations and the associated impulse responses then reveals the effects of the
element in which the two models differ: Goods search (S) enables a mon-
etary shock to affect sales through an enhanced search intensity. Without
inventory holdings there is no further effect of goods search. The introduc-
tion of inventories (I) allows the above stated feedback mechanism between
the search-enhancing effect and the inventory effect to come into play. In-
ventories provide the necessary link between today’s increase in sales and
tomorrows decrease in goods supply, which in turn enhances search intensity.
Even in the absence of labor search this propagation mechanism generates
a considerable persistence in the responses of the model variables. Costly
labor search (L) adds three elements to the model: First, labor gets pre-
determined and hence there is no impact effect of a monetary shock to the
level of employment. Second, the persistence of the reactions is increased
by 4 quarters. Since employment cannot adjust immediately to a higher
demand in period 2 inventories cannot be refilled as quickly and the excess
demand is larger than in the model with a Walrasian labor market. This in
turn implies that the search intensity in period 2 is higher than in the model
without labor search. Hence, the feedback is stronger and the economy shows
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more persistent responses. Third, the reactions of employment are smoothed
over a long period because of costly hiring and thus feature a hump shape.
Hence, to get a hump-shaped employment response, the labor search friction
is essential.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a thor-
ough description of the model of Shi[22] and its solution. In section 3 the
calibration exercise is described in detail and the results of the general sen-
sitivity analysis are documented. A pairwise comparison of model variations
in order to isolate the respective roles of goods search, inventory holdings and
labor search is performed in section 4. A discussion in section 5 summarizes
the results and suggests possible extensions of the model.
2 The Complete Search-Theoretic Monetary
Model
2.1 The Economy and its Matching Process
In the following I present Shi’s[22] version of the search-theoretic monetary
model. In this version there are two search frictions: costly labor search
and costly search for consumption goods. The economy is populated by a
continuum of households with measure one, denoted by H. Each household
produces a distinct good with labor as the only input to production.12 Each
good h ∈ H is storable only by its producer. The production function has
the form f(n) = nef , where n is the level of employment and ef < 1, so that
f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0. Workers have to be hired through a costly search process.
Each household h ∈ H produces good h and wants to consume a subset
of goods different from its own product. This induces a need for exchange
before consumption is possible. In the absence of a centralized market with
a Walrasian auctioneer households have to search for trading partners with
the desired goods. Generally, there will be no double-coincidence of wants.
The literature following Kiyotaki and Wright[11],[12] showed that in random
search models under certain parametrizations fiat money gets valuable and is
the only medium of exchange. To establish this in the present model would
12Shi [22] abstracts from the propagation through capital accumulation to focus on the
role of search in the goods market for propagating monetary shocks. Menner[16] studies
the additional effects of capital accumulation in the propagation of shocks.
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require a more detailed consideration of the exchange patterns. Instead,
Shi[22] assumes that fiat money is required in each transaction.
The matching in the goods market between sellers and buyers and in the
labor market between producers and unemployed is assumed to be random.
Hence, in a standard setup, where households consist of few individuals, in-
dividual agents would face idiosyncratic risks: a priori, buyers do not know
whether they can find the desired good and exchange it for the money they
carry with them or whether they have to carry their money home again
without having found their consumption good; sellers do not know whether
their product will be exchanged for money and whether they will be able
to pay their workers; producers do not know whether their vacancies are
filled, unemployed do not know whether they get hired or not, and so on.
As a consequence, money holdings and inventories would not be equally dis-
tributed among households. In addition, the employment status as well as
the number of people employed would be different among households. Hence,
these variables would be individual state variables for each household. To
avoid the need of tracking the distributions of money holdings, inventories,
employment status and level of employment, it is assumed that the decision
unit - the household - is itself a continuum of different agents. These mem-
bers of the household share the bought consumption goods and regard the
household’s utility as the common objective. Wage payment regardless of
whether the firms had a suitable match in the goods market is made possible
by resource sharing of firms within a household. Inventory holdings as well
as employees for the next period are shared among the firms of a household,
too. Under these assumptions there is no idiosyncratic risk anymore due to
the random matching process.
The household consists of five groups: one group of members enjoys leisure
while the other four groups are active in markets: Entrepreneurs (set Ap with
measure ap), unemployed (Au, measure u) workers (Ant, measure apnt), and
buyers (Ab, measure ab). The values of ap, u and ab are assumed to be
constant, while the number of workers per firm nt may vary over time. An
entrepreneur consists of two agents: a producer and a seller. A producer in
household h hires workers from other households to produce good h, which
is sold by the seller. A worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor each
period to other households’ firms. A buyer searches with search intensity
s > 0 to buy the household’s desired good. The sellers’ search intensity is set
to 1. Thus, we focus only on the effect of monetary policy on buyers’ search
intensity. Let B = ab/ap be the buyers/sellers ratio.
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In the following a hat on a variable indicates that the household takes this
variable and all its future values as given when making the decisions at t.
The total number of matches in the goods market is given by the matching
function:
g (sˆ) ≡ z1 (absˆ)α (ap)1−α , α ∈ (0, 1) .
By normalizing z ≡ z1Bα−1 the matching rate per unit of search intensity is
gb (sˆ) ≡ zsˆα−1, so that a buyer finds a desirable seller at a rate sgb, and a
seller meets a desirable buyer at a rate gs (sˆ) ≡ zBsˆα. Thus, the measure of
the set of buyers with suitable matches, Ab∗ , is sgbab and that of sellers with
suitable matches, Ap∗, is gsap.13
Each buyer j having found a seller −j with his desired good exchanges
mˆt (j) units of money for qˆt (−j) units of good −j, which implies a price of
good −j in this match of Pˆt (j) = mˆt (j) /qˆt (−j) and an average price of
goods of Pˆt.14
Each producer j can create vacancies vt (j) with a cost of K (vt (j)). Un-
employed workers have to search for a job and they do this by supplying one
unit of search effort inelastically. A worker supplies inelastically one unit
of labor each period and receives a wage Wˆ (j) in units of money. There
is an exogenous constant job separation rate δn. The matching function in
the labor market is linearly homogeneous. The number of matches between
firms and unemployed workers is given by (apvˆ)A (u)1−A and the number of
matches per vacancy is µ (vˆ) ≡ (apvˆ/u)A−1 .
2.2 The Household’s Decisions
At the beginning of period t the household distributes the available moneyMt
evenly among the buyers. Then the four active groups go to their respective
markets and do not meet until the end of the period. While the agents are
engaged in their transactions each household receives a lump sum monetary
transfer τ t from the central bank. At the end of the period the members of the
household arrive at home carrying their trade receipts and residual balances
and profits. They consume in equal parts the bought consumption goods.
Then the money not spent by the buyers, the wages earned and the profits
are added to the money balance of the household for next period’s shopping.
13The notation ∗ stands for agents that are suitably matched in the current period.
14The notation −j stands for an agent with whom agent j is matched.
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Also, goods inventories and employees are shared among the household’s
firms.
Households decide at the beginning of each period about their consump-
tion ct and the amount of ‘fiat’ money they want to distribute to the buyers
in the next period Mt+1. They choose the intensity of search for each buyer
st (j) , the number of vacancies for each firm vt (j) , as well as the inventory
level and the amount of labor they have in each of their firms in period
t+ 1, it+1 (j) and nt+1 (j). Denote by st, vt, it+1, and nt+1 the corresponding
distributions over all j. In their decision households take the sequence of
terms of trade and wages
n
qˆt, mˆt, Wˆt
o
t≥0
as given, as well as the initial dis-
tributions {M0, i0, n0}. Since both buyers and sellers have a positive surplus
from trade, it is optimal for households to chose Mt+1, nt+1 and it+1 such
that in period t+ 1 every buyer carries the required amount of money mˆt+1
and that every seller has qˆt+1 units of good h to be sold. The assumptions
M0 ≥ mˆ0 (j) ab and i0 (j) + f (n0 (j)) ≥ qˆ0 (j) ensure that buyers and sellers
carry the necessary amounts of money and goods also in period 0.
A household’s utility depends on its utility from consuming ct units of
its preferred consumption good, the disutility of labor of the apnt workers
and the disutility from searching for the ab buyers, which depends on their
search intensity. Finally the cost of maintaining vacancies for the ap firms
decreases the households utility. Each household maximizes its expected
lifetime utility over an infinite time horizon choosing the series of variables
Γh ≡ {ct, st, vt,Mt+1, it+1, nt+1}t≥0 :
max
Γh
E0



∞X
t=0
βt

U (ct)−
Z
Ant
ϕdj −
Z
Ab
Φ (st (j)) dj −
Z
Ap
Υ (vt (j)) dj





(PH)
The maximization is subject to the following constraints that are explained
below:
ct ≤
Z
Abt∗
qˆt (−j) dj, (1)
Mt+1
ab
≥ mˆt+1 (j) , ∀j ∈ Abt+1∗, (2)
it+1 (j) + f (nt+1 (j)) ≥ qˆt+1 (j) , ∀j ∈ Apt+1∗, (3)
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Mt+τ t−
Z
Abt∗
mˆt (j) dj+
Z
Ant
PˆtWˆt (−j) dj+
Z
Apt∗
mˆt (−j) dj−Pˆt
Z
Ap
Wˆt (j)nt (j) dj ≥Mt+1,
(4)Z
Ap
[(1− δn)nt (j) + vt (j)µt (j)− nt+1 (j)] dj ≥ 0, (5)
(1− δi)


Z
Ap
[it (j) + f (nt (j))] dj −
Z
Apt∗
qˆt (j) dj

 ≥
Z
Ap
it+1 (j) dj. (6)
Constraint (1) states that the household’s consumption has to be bought
by buyers which successfully meet a trading partner and have been endowed
with sufficient money for the purchase of qˆt each. Condition (2) ensures that
next period all suitably matched buyers have a sufficient amount of money
on hand, while (3) is a similar trading restriction for suitably matched sellers:
each should have a sufficient stock of inventory and newly produced goods to
satisfy the demand of the costumer. Inequality (4) restricts money holdings
at the beginning of period t + 1 not to exceed the money holdings at the
beginning of period t plus the monetary injection minus the money spent
plus the cash receipts from firms. Condition (5) states that a household can
not allocate more workers of other households to its firms in period t+1 than
those who worked in firms of the household in period t and have not quitted
plus the newly hired workers. Finally, inequality (6) restricts inventories in
period t+1 to be no larger than the fraction of the excess supply of goods in
period t that has not depreciated. The quitting rate δn and the depreciation
rate of inventories δi are assumed to be constant.
In order to express the first order conditions (FOC) conveniently denote
the shadow price of money at the beginning of period t+1, measured in terms
of period-t utility, by ωMt. Then ωMt is the multiplier of (4). Similarly let ωnt
be the shadow value of workers at the beginning of period t+1 and ωit be the
shadow price of inventory at the beginning of period t + 1, again measured
in terms of period-t utility. Thus, ωnt and ωit are the multipliers of (5) and
(6). Also, let Λt, ωqt, be the multipliers of equations (2) and (3), respectively,
both measured in terms of period-t utility. Since utility is increasing in ct,
expression (1) takes the equality form and the right hand side (RHS) can be
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plugged into the utility function. The solution to the maximization problem
is then given by the FOCs (with respect to Mt+1, it+1, nt+1, st, and vt ):
ωMt = βE {ωMt+1 + gb(sˆt+1)st+1 (j)Λt+1 (j)} , (7)
ωit = βE {gs(sˆt+1)ωqt+1 (j) + (1− δi)ωit+1} , (8)
ωnt = βE
n
(1− δn)ωnt+1 − ωMt+1Pˆt+1Wˆt+1 (j)
o
+ ωitf 0 (nt+1 (j)) , (9)
Φ0 (st (j)) = gb(sˆt) [U 0 (ct) qˆt (−j)− ωMtmˆt (j)] , (10)
µ (j)ωnt = Υ0 (v((j)) , (11)
with the slackness conditions associated with (2) and (3):
Λt (j)
·
Mt
ab
− mˆt (j)
¸
= 0, ∀j ∈ Abt∗, (12)
ωqt (j) [it (j) + f (nt (j))− qˆt (j)] = 0, ∀j ∈ Apt∗. (13)
Equation (7) characterizes the dynamics of the shadow value of money
held for period t + 1. The value of holding one unit of money today must
be equal to the discounted value of holding this unit tomorrow plus the
discounted value of relaxing constraint (12) for gbt+1st+1 desirably matched
buyers. Expression (8) is the analogue for inventories held for period t + 1:
the value of holding one unit of inventory today is equal to the discounted
value of the fraction (1− δi) of this inventory which is still available tomorrow
plus the discounted value of relaxing the trading constraint (13) for the gst+1
suitably matched sellers. The value of an additional worker is given in (9) by
the discounted expected value of his value as a worker being further employed
minus the discounted expected value of the wage to be paid to him plus the
discounted expected value of his marginal contribution in production. The
latter is given by the value of its marginal product when selling the good plus
its value when storing it as inventory, as indicated by relation (8). Expression
(10) is a static equation determining the search intensity of the buyers. The
disutility of an additional unit of search effort is equalized to its benefit: the
increase in the expected utility of trading mˆ units of money for qˆ units of
consumption due to an increase of the probability of a successful match by
gbt+1. Equation (11) equates the expected benefit of an additional vacancy
ωntµ (j) to its marginal cost.
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Hence, the solution to this decision problem is given by a system of 8
equations consisting of the above optimality conditions together with the
laws of motion for money balances, employment and inventories (4) - (6).
The system of equations has 8 unknowns once the terms of trade are specified
and the equilibrium conditions are imposed. This is done in the following
subsections.
2.3 Terms of Trade
There are no centralized markets in this model where prices could be de-
termined. The early goods search literature assumed indivisible goods and
indivisible money and that agents could only carry either 1 unit of a good
or 1 unit of money. So the price was always 1 by definition. If one wants
to allow for divisible goods and divisible money another device for price de-
termination is needed. Here a Nash bargaining process is assumed as it is
commonly done in the goods search literature.
2.3.1 Goods Market
To determine the terms of trade in each match and the associated price
P = m/q, each agent is re-interpreted as an identity of a small measure ∆
. After calculating the terms of trade contingent on ∆ we take the limit
∆ → 0. When a seller from household h meets a buyer of household −h,
the trade at the terms (q∆, m¯∆) leads to the following surpluses in the two
agents’ households:15
The seller’s surplus: ωMtm¯t∆− [(1− δi)ωit + ωqt] qt∆ .
The buyer’s surplus: U (c¯t + qt∆)− U (c¯t)−
¡
ω¯Mt + Λ¯t
¢
m¯t∆ .
Nash-bargaining with equal weights and taking the limit ∆→ 0 leads to the
expressions:
PtωMt = ωqt + (1− δi)ωit, (14)
U 0 (c¯t) = Pt
¡
ω¯Mt + Λ¯t
¢
. (15)
15In what follows symbols with a bar refer to variables of household −h.
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2.3.2 Wage Bargaining
The firm’s surplus from hiring a new worker is given by:
[ωnt − β (1− δn)ωnt+1]∆ = ωit (f (nt+1 +∆)− f (nt+1))− βωt+1Wt+1∆ .
The increase in the household’s utility from another member being working
is:
β (ω¯t+1Wt+1 − ϕ)∆ .
The bargaining outcome is the wage rate that maximizes the weighted Nash
product of the two agent’s surpluses, with weight σ ∈ (0, 1). After taking
the limit ∆→ 0, the wage reads:
Wt+1 = σ
ϕ
ω¯t+1
+ (1− σ) ωitf
0 (nt+1)
βωt+1
. (16)
2.4 Equilibrium
DEFINITION:A symmetric search equilibrium is a sequence of household’s
choices Γh ≡ {Γht}t≥0, Γht ≡ (ct, st, vt,Mt+1,it+1, nt+1) , expected quantities
in trade Xˆ ≡
n
Xˆt
o
t≥0
, Xˆt ≡
³
mˆt, qˆt, Wˆt
´
, terms of trade X ≡ {Xt}t≥0 and
expected average variables sˆ ≡ {sˆt}t≥0 and vˆ ≡ {vˆt}t≥0 such that
(i) all variables are identical across households and relevant individuals;
(ii) given
n
Xˆt
o
t≥0
and (M0, i0, n0), Γh solves (PH) with (s, v) = (sˆ, vˆ) ;
(iii) Xt satisfies (14), (15) and (16);
(iv) Xˆt = Xt ∀ t ≥ 0.
This definition implies that each household takes the sequence Xˆ as given
when choosing Γh.16
Considering only symmetric equilibria the hats on aggregate variables
and bars on household specific variables can be suppressed. For convenience
define ωt ≡ PtωMt, and λt ≡ PtΛt. Hence (14) and (15) become:
ωqt = ωt − (1− δi)ωit, (17)
λt = U 0 (ct)− ωt. (18)
16A symmetric equilibrium is determined as follows: For any given Xˆ the household’s
choices are a correspondence Γh = G
³
Xˆ
´
(part (ii)). The bargaining problem determines
X as a correspondence of the particular household’s and other households’ choices, X =
g(Γh,Γ−h) (part (iii)). Symmetry and (iv) imply that (Γ,X) solve Γ = G (g(Γ,Γ)) and
X = g(G (X) , G (X)).
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Shi[22] restricts attention to the equilibrium where λ > 0 and ωq > 0. In this
economy with a storage technology the latter is valid whenever a seller prefers
selling a good to hoarding it (i.e. as long as ω > (1− δi)ωit). A positive (but
bounded) inventory is a sufficient condition for this. The former inequality
requires that a buyer prefers spending to hoarding his money (i.e., U 0 > ω).
This is implied by a positive nominal interest rate, but is not given anymore
under the so called ‘Friedman rule’, according to which the gross growth rate
of money should be equal to the discount factor. Around the steady state
these requirements for λ and ωq being positive are fulfilled.
The equation defining this equilibrium can be further reduced as follows:
Note that the price level is Pt = m/q = Mt/ (abqt) . Define the gross rate of
money growth between periods t and t+ 1 as:
γt ≡Mt+1/Mt.
Thus, the gross inflation rate between periods t and t+ 1 is given by:
Pt+1/Pt = γtqt/qt+1.
To simplify the calculations it is possible to express the equilibrium conditions
in terms of the variables (v, n, ωi, ω, q) by elimination of other the remaining
variables (i, ωq, λ, c, µ, ωn,W,m, s):
With ωq > 0, i = q − f (n) . The multiplier ωq can be replaced by ω −
(1− δi)ωi through (17). When λ > 0, ct = apBzsαt qt. With (18) λ can
be eliminated. Under symmetry µ is a function of v and one can define
k (v) ≡ ωn = Υ0 (v) /µ (v) .
By definition m = Pq, so (10) takes the following form after substituting
the expressions for gb and ct :
s1−αt Φ0 (st) = zqt [U 0 (apBzsαt qt)− ωt] . (19)
The search intensity s is thus a decreasing function of ω and q:
st = s(ωt, qt), sω < 0, sq < 0.
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2.5 Dynamic Equations
After substitution of the above relations into (5)-(9) one obtains the following
dynamic system:
nt+1 = (1− δn)nt + vtµt (v) , (20)
qt+1 = (1− δi) (1−Bzsαt ) qt + f (nt+1) , (21)
ωt = E
½
β
γt
.qt+1qt
¡
ωt+1 + zsαt+1 [U 0 (ct+1)− ωt+1]
¢¾
, (22)
ωit = βE {(1− δi)ωit+1 +Bzsαt (ωt+1 − (1− δi)ωit+1)} , (23)
k (vt) = E {β (1− δn) k (vt+1) + σ [ωitf 0 (nt+1)− βϕ]} . (24)
2.6 Note on the Timing of the Model
Throughout this paper I use the same timing of events as in the model of
Shi, which will be explained below. The following discussion, however, is
intended to make the reader aware that the timing matters.
Households receive a lump-sum monetary transfer at the end of each
period. The gross rate of money growth between periods t and t+ 1 is
γt =Mt+1/Mt = (Mt + τ t)/Mt,
and follows an AR(1) process:
γt = (1− ρg)γ∗ + ρgγt−1 + εgt, E(εg) = 0, E(ε2g) = σ2g.
The issue of the influence of the timing of a monetary injection in CIA
models was put forward in Salyer[20]. The timing of the monetary injection
in the search-theoretic model of Shi[22] differs, e.g., from the one in Lucas[15]
where the monetary injection is at the beginning of the period. As pointed
out by Salyer[20]: “with the transfer received at the end of the period, the
realization of the monetary growth rate at time t provides agents with perfect
information about the money stock in the goods market at times t and t+1
. [...] ...it is the current, as opposed to next period’s monetary growth rate
that influences the inflation rate between periods t and t+ 1. (p. 770)”
An implication of this timing is that independently and identically dis-
tributed growth rates over time are not a sufficient condition for dynamic
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neutrality.17 As a consequence impulse shocks do have real effects in this
economy, as opposed to the case with monetary injections at the beginning
of the period, where some persistence of the shocks is needed to generate
effects of a monetary shock on employment, consumption and other real
variables. With serially correlated shocks impulse responses have exactly the
same shape under both timing assumptions, but the respective magnitudes
differ. Assuming, for example, ρg = 0.4, the magnitude of the impulse re-
sponses is 2.5 to 3 times higher with an end-of-the-period shock than with
a beginning-of-the-period shock, depending on which variable is considered.
For ρg = 0.85, however, the difference in magnitude vanishes mostly. As
stated above, I stick to the timing of Shi[22] for the sake of better compari-
son, but the reader should keep in mind that the timing matters.
3 Calibration and Sensitivity Analysis
3.1 Calibration to Intervals
The usual method of calibrating parameters to point estimates assumes im-
plicitly that these values are known with certainty. Instead, I use here a
procedure suggested by Canova[2],[3] that reflects better the uncertainty of
a calibrator in choosing the proper values. The idea is to calibrate each
parameter of the model to an interval, using the empirical information one
obtains from the literature to construct a distribution over this interval. This
means, for each parameter a range of economically reasonable values is spec-
ified. When different point estimates are found in the literature for some
parameter, their frequency is used to form a distribution over this parameter
range, otherwise a uniform distribution is assumed. Then the model is simu-
lated drawing parameter vectors from the joint distribution. This procedure
allows to perform an overall sensitivity analysis over the whole support of
the parameter distributions by examination of the mean response and its
95% error bands. In order to achieve comparability I either center these pa-
rameter intervals around the calibrated values reported in Shi[22] when the
range of uncertainty seems to be symmetric, or I choose economically rea-
sonable ranges which contain Shi’s values. The ranges of the intervals and
the distributions used are shown in Table 1.
17Dynamic neutrality means that real balances are constant when the only source of
uncertainty is a monetary shock. For more details see Salyer[20], p. 770f.
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3.2 Global Sensitivity Analysis
After log-linearizing the dynamic equilibrium equations around the steady
state I conduct 250 simulations.18 In each iteration a new set of the exoge-
nously chosen parameters is drawn from the distributions indicated in Table
1. The realized values and the values of the endogenously determined param-
eters are stored. Then the implied steady state values of the variables are
calculated and the model is solved. Finally, the implied impulse responses to
a monetary shock are calculated.
The mean and the interval containing 90% of the simulated parameter
values are documented in Table 2. Simulated mean values are quite near to
the values implied by the point calibration. Exceptions are the production
elasticity ef , the disutility of labor ϕ and the hiring cost parameter K0.
In each case the respective mean value is larger than the associated point
estimate. In what follows I describe the simulated impulse responses of the
model variables to an end-of-the-period shock in money growth.
Consider first the results shown in Figure 1. Each graph displays the
mean response of a variable i, Θˆi, together with its 95% error bands. The
latter are computed as one-dimensional error bands Θˆi(t) ± ∆i(t) for each
quarter t after the shock. In other words these are pointwise error bands.
Employment shows a significant positive response up to 15 quarters. The
mean response is quite similar to the response reported in Shi[22]. It also
peaks after 4 quarters and is slightly higher in magnitude. The error bands
indicate uncertainty about the quarter in which the response peaks. With
97.5% probability the responses do not reach their maximum before the third
quarter. The upper limit of this range is less clear. The waves in the upper
error band indicate that there were some simulated responses with very high
persistence. Figure 1b shows a significant decrease of the quantity exchanged
up to 8 quarters. The uncertainty seems to be mostly with respect to the
level of the response and only little with respect to the shape. This last
feature holds also for the variables shown in Figures 1c to 1h. For these
variables only two things need to be emphasized. First, there is a substantial
uncertainty regarding the impact response of search intensity and therefore of
sales. Second, the mean response - and similarly the response with Shi’s[22]
parametrization - of the search intensity stays 8 quarters above steady state,
and the 95% error bands indicate that the search intensity stays significantly
above steady state for 5 quarters.
18For this porpuse I use the solver of Uhlig[27].
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However, the reader should be careful in interpreting the upper and lower
bands as impulse responses. Sims and Zha[25] point out that pointwise error
bands do not necessarily represent impulse response functions at the “bound-
aries of likely variation” in the distribution of impulse responses Θi. In other
words, the upper and lower bands do not necessarily represent likely devia-
tions of the impulse response function from the mean response. Interpreting
these bands as draws from the distribution of impulse responses Θi is only
plausible if there is a very high serially correlation in the uncertainty about Θi
across time. In order to better characterize uncertainty regarding the mag-
nitude and shape of impulse responses Sims and Zha[25] propose a change
of the coordinate system were the impulse response functions are examined.
The new coordinate system is formed by projections on the principal compo-
nents of the covariance matrix ω of the jointly distributed {Θi(t)}Ht=0 vector,
where H is the horizon considered for the impulse response. As Sims and
Zha[25] claim, the resulting probability bands can convey more information
about the kind of uncertainty there is regarding the shape and the magnitude
of the impulse responses.19
Figure 2 shows the plots of the 95%probability bands for the first and sec-
ond components of ω for the impulse responses of employment and quantity-
exchanged. The first component accounts for 80% and 85%, respectively,
of the sum of the eigenvalues, the second component for 19% and 13%, re-
spectively. Graphs for the other variables are not presented since they do
not convey additional information: the bands of the first component and the
pointwise bands are nearly identical.
For employment and quantity-exchanged, however, these graphs give ad-
ditional insights. Figures 2a and 2c together show that the shape of the im-
pulse response of employment is quite uncertain. It is revealed more clearly
19To calculate this probability bands one has to accumulate a first and second moment
matrix during the simulations from which one computes the estimated covariance matrix
ω and its eigenvalue decomposition ΨΛΨ0 = ω. Any Θi is now representable as Θi =
Θˆi +
PH
k=1 ξkΨ.k , where Ψ.k is the kth column of Ψ, i.e. the kth eigenvector of ω. Then
the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the weights ξj corresponding to the largest eigenvalues λj
(principal components) of ω can be calculated by making another pass through the saved
draws of the impulse responses. ξ = {ξk}Hk=0 can be calculated for a particular draw of Θi
by ξ = Ψ0 · (Θi − Θˆi). For each component j the two functions Θˆi + ξj,0.975Ψ.j and Θˆi +
ξj,0.025Ψ.j each show a likely direction of variation in Θi. Unlike the functions of t plotted
in pointwise error bands the plots of these functions show impulse response functions that
lie in the boundary of the Gaussian confidence ellipsoid when the distribution of Θi is
Gaussian.
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than in Figure 1 that the uncertainty does not only concern the magnitude of
the impulse response but also the time it takes until the response peaks. The
upper bound for likely peaks is 6 quarters for the first component, but is likely
to be reduced by the second component, since the second component of those
impulse responses which start above the mean response reaches its maximum
between the 4th and 5th quarter. On the other hand, responses that start
below the mean response are likely to have a higher persistence and to peak
later. In contrast with the above conjecture that uncertainty regarding the
response of the quantity exchanged is merely uncertainty regarding the level,
Figures 2b and 2d reveal that there is substantial uncertainty regarding the
shape of the response, too.
To summarize, one can say that, although the shape and the magnitude
of the responses of employment vary considerably, Shi’s claim to have found
a model with highly persistent hump-shaped employment responses is shown
to be quite insensitive to variations of the parameters within economically
reasonable ranges.
4 Examination of the PropagationMechanism
In this section the search-theoretic monetary model of Shi[22] is modified in
several ways in order to isolate the role of its three key elements: goods-search
(S), inventory holdings (I) and labor-search (L). For this purpose it suffices to
consider 4 variations. The scheme below shows how only one feature varies
in each pairwise comparison of subsequent models. In the “goods search
and inventories” (SI) model the labor search friction is replaced by a Wal-
rasian labor market. The “goods and labor-search” (S_L) model is another
variation of Shi’s[22] model where the produced goods can not be stored in
inventories. The “CIA and labor-search” (C_L) model is set up similar to
the “goods and labor-search” (S_L) model but using a CIA constraint in a
Walrasian goods market, as opposed to costly search for goods.20
20When we replace costly search for goods by a CIA constraint in a Walrasian goods
market in a model without inventories and without labor search, the disutility of labor
parameter does not enter in the log-linearized dynamic system. So, the model is not rich
enough to be sensitive to labor supply changes. This problem does not arise when labor
search is introduced.
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Scheme of Pairwise Model Comparison
Model Symbol
goods
search
inventory
holdings
labor
search
Goods Search & Inventory SI_ S I −
Shi (1998) SIL S I L
Goods- & Labor-Search S_L S − L
CIA & Labor-Search C_L − − L
isolates
role of:
} L
} I
} S
In the following subsections I describe shortly the main differences of
each of these models with respect to the model of Shi[22]. In particular, the
derived FOCs and equilibrium conditions as well as the resulting system of
dynamic equations are presented there. Proofs of existence of a steady state
can be found in Appendix A, while modifications in the calibration procedure
are presented in Appendix B. The log-linearized systems of equations were
again solved with Uhlig’s[27] toolkit. The impulse responses are analyzed at
the end of this section.
4.1 Goods-Search and Inventory Model
In this model variant labor search is replaced by Walrasian labor market
clearing. A symmetric equilibrium with Walrasian labor market would imply
that each firm of each household employs the same amount of workers nt and
pays a market clearing wage rate. The optimality condition that determines
nt is that the marginal disutility of labor is equalized to the marginal benefit
resulting from employing an additional worker. However, the same condition
and the same allocation would arise if workers were employed in the own
household’s firms. Thus, for sake of simplicity I assume the latter setup
where no equilibrium wages have to be determined. But I still refer to it as
a Walrasian labor market because of the above stated equivalence.
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4.1.1 The Households’ Decisions
Households do not maintain vacancies in an economy without labor search.
Instead, at the beginning of each period, they decide directly about the
amount of labor they use in each of their firms in the next period nt+1(j).21
As before, they decide about consumption ct and the intensity of search for
their desired goods st, the inventory level for period t + 1, it+1, and the
amount of money they want to distribute to the buyers in the next period,
Mt+1. In the law of motion of money balances there are no wage receipts
and wage payments to consider. The law of motion of employment vanishes
since a new level of employment can be achieved immediately in the absence
of a search friction.
The necessary conditions for an optimum are given by the following FOCs
(with respect to Mt+1, it+1, st, and nt+1):
ωMt = βE [ωMt+1 + gbt+1st+1 (j)Λt+1 (j)] , (25)
ωit = βE [(1− δi)ωit+1 + gst+1ωqt+1 (j)] , (26)
Φ0 (st (j)) = gb(sˆt) [U 0 (ct) qˆt (−j)− ωMtmˆt (j)] , (27)
ϕ = E [(gst+1ωqt+1 (j) + (1− δi)ωit+1)] f 0 (nt+1 (j)) . (28)
As stated already above, (28) determines the amount of employment by
equating the marginal disutility of labor with the marginal benefit of an
additional worker. The fact that this equation replaces (9) and (11) is the
only difference in the FOCs with respect to the model with labor search.
The terms of trade are the same as before and equilibrium conditions can
again be simplified. The latter can be expressed in terms of (ωi, ω, n, q) by
elimination of the variables (i, ωq, λ, c,W,m, s).
21Households are assumed to decide nt+1, as opposed to nt, in order to have employment
in period t predetermined as in the model of Shi [22]. Loosing this predeterminedness
would lead to a negative impact reaction of employment in response to a non-persistent
monetary shock. The difference in the effects of choosing nt versus nt+1 is discussed in
more detail in subsection 4.4. See also paragraph 4.1.3 for the model’s solution when nt
is chosen.
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Then (28) reads:
ϕ = E
£
Bzsαt+1ωt+1 + (1− δi)
¡
1−Bzsαt+1
¢
ωit+1
¤
f 0 (nt+1) . (29)
Equation (26) can be written as:
ωit = βE
£
(1− δi) (1−Bzsαt+1)ωit+1 +Bzsαt+1ωt+1
¤
. (30)
Combining (29) and (30) we obtain:
ωit = β
ϕ
f 0 (nt+1)
.
Now, update the last expression and substitute into (29) to obtain:
n1−eft+1 = E
·
ef
ϕ Bzs
α
t+1ωt+1 + β (1− δi)
¡
1−Bzsαt+1
¢
n1−eft+2
¸
. (31)
Equation (25) can be expressed as:
ωt =
β
γtqt
E {qt+1 (ωt+1 + zsα [U 0 (apBzsαqt+1)− ωt+1])} . (32)
Replacing i by q−f (n) , the equilibrium law of motion of inventories becomes:
qt+1 = (1− δi) (1−Bzsα) qt + f (nt+1) . (33)
4.1.2 Dynamic Equations
Plugging s(ωt, qt) into (31), (32) and (33) results in the following dynamic
system:
n1−eft+1 = E
·
ef
ϕ Bzs(ωt+1, qt+1)
αωt+1 + β (1− δi) (1−Bzs(ωt+1, qt+1)α)n
1−ef
t+2
¸
,
(34)
ωt =
β
γtqt
E {qt+1 (ωt+1 + zs(ωt+1, qt+1)α [U 0 (apBzs(ωt+1, qt+1)αqt+1)− ωt+1])} ,
(35)
qt+1 = (1− δi) (1−Bzs(ωt, qt)α) qt + f (nt+1) . (36)
Thus, the assumption of a Walrasian labor market instead of labor search
reduces the dynamic system to 3 equations. The existence of a steady state
is proven in Appendix A.1.
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4.1.3 Modification: Choice of Current Employment
In the pairwise comparison I also consider a version of the above model where
nt is chosen in period t and hence employment is not predetermined anymore.
In this case, the solution to the corresponding maximization problem is given
by the following FOCs (with respect to Mt+1, it+1, st, nt):
ωMt = βE [ωMt+1 + gbt+1st+1 (j)Λt+1 (j)] , (37)
ωit = βE [(1− δi)ωit+1 + gst+1ωqt+1 (j)] , (38)
Φ0 (st (j)) = gb(sˆt) [U 0 (ct) qˆt (−j)− ωMtmˆt (j)] , (39)
ϕ = (gstωqt (j) + (1− δi)ωit) f 0 (nt (j)) . (40)
The terms of trade are the same as in the inventory model with predetermined
employment. The optimality conditions can again be simplified as before.
Substituting ωqt into equation (40) yields:
ϕ = (Bzs(ωt, qt)αωt + (1− δi) (1−Bzs(ωt, qt)α)ωit) f 0 (nt) . (41)
Solving for ωit we obtain:
ωit =
ϕn1−eft
ef (1− δi) (1−Bzs(ωt, qt)α)
− Bzs(ωt, qt)
αωt
(1− δi) (1−Bzs(ωt, qt)α)
. (42)
Equation (38) can be written as:
ωit = βE [(1− δi) (1−Bzs(ωt+1, qt+1)α)ωit+1 +Bzs(ωt+1, qt+1)αωt+1]
= βE
"
ϕn 1−eft+1
ef
#
. (43)
Thus, equalizing (43) and (42) one obtains:
βE
"
ϕn 1−eft+1
ef
#
=
ϕn1−eft
ef (1− δi) (1−Bzsαt )
− Bzs
α
t ωt
(1− δi) (1−Bzsαt )
⇔
E
h
n 1−eft+1
i
=
n1−eft −
ef
ϕ Bzsαt ωt
β (1− δi) (1−Bzsαt )
. (44)
The remaining two dynamic equations are the same as in the model with
predetermined employment. Both models have the same steady state.
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4.2 Goods- and Labor-Search Model
4.2.1 The Household’s Decisions
Here it is assumed that firms cannot store their non-sold goods for next
period. Thus, the sellers can serve the demand of buyers only from current
production. Hence, the sellers’ constraint has to be modified to:
f (nt (j)) ≥ qˆt (j) , ∀j ∈ Apt∗.
Note that in the absence of a storage technology there is no law of motion of
inventories in the optimization problem anymore.
The associated FOCs are:
ωMt = βE {gb(sˆt+1)st+1 (j)Λt+1 (j) + ωMt+1} , (45)
ωnt = βE
n
(1− δn)ωnt+1 − ωMt+1Pˆt+1Wˆt+1 (j) + gs(sˆt+1)ωqt+1 (j) f 0 (nt+1 (j))
o
,
(46)
Φ0 (st (j)) = gb(sˆt) [U 0 (ct) qˆt (−j)− ωMtmˆt (j)] , (47)
ωnt = K 0 (v((j)) /µ (j) . (48)
Apart from the lack of the dynamic equation for the shadow value of in-
ventories, ωi, there is only one difference with the complete model: Compar-
ing (46) with (9) one sees that ωit is now replaced by βE {gs(sˆt+1)ωqt+1 (j)} .
Remember from expression (26) that ωit = βE{gs(sˆt+1)ωqt+1 (j) + (1− δi)ωit+1}.
This means that the value of the units of consumption good produced by an
additional worker tomorrow is now given solely by their value of being sold.
In the complete model, instead, the facility to serve as inventory adds to
their value.
4.2.2 Terms of Trade
The terms of trade are determined again by Nash bargaining. In the fol-
lowing I expose the implied modifications and the solution to the modified
bargaining problem.
Goods Market The seller’s surplus is unchanged while the buyer’s surplus
is now: ωMtm¯t∆− ωqtqt∆.
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This leads to the following Nash bargaining solution:
ωqt = ωt, (49)
λ¯t = U 0 (c¯t)− ω¯t. (50)
The shadow value of giving up one unit of consumption equals the shadow
value of the received money. There is no compensation for the forgone value of
storing the good as inventory, since it cannot be stored under the maintained
assumptions.
Wage Bargaining The firm’s surplus from hiring a new worker is:
[ωnt − β (1− δn)ωnt+1]∆ = βgs(sˆt+1)ωqt+1 (f (nt+1 +∆)− f (nt+1))−βωt+1Wt+1∆ .
The increase in the household’s utility from another member being working
is as in the complete model:
β (ω¯t+1Wt+1 − ϕ)∆ .
The bargaining outcome with weight σ ∈ (0, 1) is:
Wt+1 = σ
ϕ
ω¯t+1
+(1− σ) ωqt+1gs(sˆt+1)f
0 (nt+1)
ωt+1
= σ ϕω¯t+1
+(1− σ) gs(sˆt+1)f 0 (nt+1) .
(51)
Hence, in equilibrium
³
mˆt, qˆt, Wˆt
´
have to satisfy (49), (50) and (51).
4.2.3 Equilibrium
The conditions to ensure λ > 0 and ωq > 0 remain unchanged. But now,
q = f (n) = M/ (abP ) . The gross inflation rate between periods t and t + 1
reads:
Pt+1/Pt = γtqt/qt+1 = γtf (nt) /f (nt+1) .
Equilibrium conditions can be expressed in terms of (n, ω, v) by elimina-
tion of the variables (ωq, λ, c,W, and m). Equation (47) takes the following
form after substituting the expressions for gb and ct :
s1−αt Φ0 (st) = zf(nt) [U 0 (apBzsαt f(nt))− ωt] . (52)
The search intensity s is thus a decreasing function of ω and n:
st = s(ωt, nt), sω < 0, sn < 0.
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4.2.4 Dynamic Equations
After substitution of these relationships into the laws of motion for money
and employment and into (45)-(46) the economy is described by the following
dynamic system of three variables (n, ω, v) in three equations:
nt+1 = (1− δn)nt + vtµt (vt) , (53)
ωt = E
½
β
γt+1
.f(nt+1)f(nt)
· [ωt+1 − zs(ωt+1, nt+1)αU 0 (apBzs(ωt+1, nt+1)αf(nt+1))
−ωt+1]} , (54)
k (vt) = βE {(1− δn) k (vt+1) + σ (ωt+1zBs(ωt+1, nt+1)αf 0 (nt+1)− ϕ)} .
(55)
The proof of existence of a steady state can be found in Appendix A.2.
4.3 CIA Model with Labor Search
The CIA model modifies the Lucas[15] model such that agents hold bonds
instead of equity in their portfolio. As opposed to Lucas’[15] model, the
money injection is at the end of the period in order to mimic the timing
of the search-theoretic model. Following Hansen[9] a production technology
with indivisible labor is introduced. In addition, costly labor search is added
as in Shi[22]. Hence, the resulting model has the same features as the search
model without inventories, except for the CIA constraint in a Walrasian
goods market, as opposed to costly search for goods.22 It can therefore
be interpreted as the Walrasian counterpart of the goods- and labor search
model.
Another way to think of this model is to consider it as a variant of the
search-model with goods search at no cost. Then s always adjusts such
that the probability for a suitable match is 1. This, in turn, is equivalent
to a matching technology that yields a suitable match with probability 1,
independently of the search intensity. With this technology the household
does not need to decide about the level of search effort. The buyers/sellers
22Note, that the incorporation of positive inventory holdings into a standard CIA model
is not possible without the incorporation of other frictions which break up the one-to-one
relation between sales and output. This would introduce differences with respect to the
search-theoretic models in other dimensions and would harm comparability.
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ratio B is equal to 1 as in the “goods and labor search” model (See Appendix
B.2). The matching technology is such that the expressions for the matching
rate of buyers and sellers, zBsα and zsα, can be replaced by 1. There are no
given terms of trade mˆ and qˆ, but prices adjust such that a seller’s production
is sold for the money the buyer carries. Thus, there is no trading constraint
for the seller and the buyers’ money constraint results in a simple cash-in-
advance constraint:
Mt ≥ abPt
R
Ap
f (nt(j)) dj
ap
= Pt
Z
Ap
f (nt(j)) dj = Ptct.
4.3.1 The Households’ Decisions
A household decides in period t about consumption ct, the number of vacan-
cies for each firm in period t, vt (j) , the level of employment in period t+ 1,
nt+1, and the money balances hold at the beginning of period t + 1, Mt+1.
Thus, its decision problem is:
max
{ct,vt,nt+1,Mt+1}t≥0
E0



∞X
t=0
βtU (ct)−
Z
Ant
ϕdj −
Z
Ap
K (vt (j)) dj



(PHCIA)
subject to:
Mt ≥ Ptct,
Mt−Ptct+Pt
Z
Ant
Wˆt(−j)dj+Pt
Z
Ap
f (nt(j)) dj−Pt
Z
Ap
Wˆt(j)nt(j)dj+τ t ≥Mt+1,
Z
Ap
[(1− δn)nt (j) + vt (j)µt (j)− nt+1 (j)] dj ≥ 0.
The optimal choice is characterized by:
ωt = βE
½µ
Pt
Pt+1
U 0(ct+1)
¶¾
, (56)
ωnt = βE
n
ωt+1
³
f 0 (nt+1(j))− Wˆt+1(j)
´
+ (1− dn)ωnt+1
o
, (57)
26
k (vt(j)) ≡
K 0 (vt(j))
µt(j)
= ωnt. (58)
Wage Bargaining
The firm’s surplus from hiring a new worker is given by:
[ωnt − β (1− δn)ωnt+1]∆ = βωt+1 (f (nt+1 +∆)− f (nt+1))− βωt+1Wt+1∆ .
The increase in the household’s utility from another member being working
is:
β (ω¯t+1Wt+1 − ϕ)∆ .
The bargaining outcome with weight σ ∈ (0, 1) is:
Wt+1 = σ
ϕ
ω¯t+1
+ (1− σ) f 0 (nt+1) . (59)
4.3.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium: c = apf(n), M = M¯ . Thus, Pt+1/Pt = Mt+1ct/Mtct+1 =
γtct/ct+1 = γtf(nt)/f(nt+1). Furthermore, Wˆt+1 = Wt+1 which can be re-
placed by 59. Plugging these equilibrium expressions into (56), substituting
(58) into (57), and using symmetry one receives:
ωt = βE
½µ
f(nt+1)
γtf(nt)
U 0(apf(nt+1))
¶¾
, (60)
k(vt) = βE {ωt+1f 0 (nt+1(j))− σϕ− (1− σ)ωt+1f 0 (nt+1) + (1− dn)k(vt+1)}
= βE {(1− δn)k(vt+1) + σ (ωt+1f 0 (nt+1(j))− ϕ)} . (61)
4.3.3 Dynamic Equations
Combined with the law of motion for employment equations (60) and (61)
result in a dynamic system consisting of three equations in n, ω, and v:
nt+1 = (1− δn)nt + vtµ (vt) , (62)
ωt = βE
½µ
f(nt+1)
γtf(nt)
U 0(apf(nt+1))
¶¾
, (63)
k(vt) = βE {(1− δn)k(vt+1) + σ (ωt+1f 0 (nt+1)− ϕ)} . (64)
As expected, these equations are equivalent to the ones in the goods search
model when zBsα = 1 and when there is no decision about s. Existence of
a steady state is proven in Appendix A.3.
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4.4 Results of Pairwise Comparison
The different model versions are calibrated as documented in Appendix B.
The log-linearized systems are solved with Uhlig’s[27] toolkit. Then impulse
responses after a monetary shock are calculated.
To isolate the effects of Goods Search (S) consider the comparison
between the “CIA and labor-search model” (C_L) and the “goods- and labor-
search model” (S_L). The only difference between the models lies in the
goods market. In the first model we have a Walrasian goods market, while
in the second there is a search friction. Neither model has inventory holdings
and both models feature a labor market friction. Figure 3 represents the
impulse responses of various variables of the C_L model (Figures 3a-3d)
and the S_L model (Figures 3e-3h), respectively, to a positive monetary
shock in period 0 with low persistence (ρ = 0.2).23 In Figures 3a and 3e
we see that the shadow value of money decreases by 1 percent in the CIA
model and by 1.2% in the goods search model. Since in the goods search
model the value of money depends also on the future value of money, there
is an ‘expected inflation effect’ in the impact response of the value of money.
Figures 3d and 3h show the employment reactions. The reason for why
employment drops by less in the goods search model is the following: As
can be seen in Figure 3e, a money shock enhances search intensity by 0.6%
on impact. Figure 3f shows the related increase of sales of 0.5 % and the
drop in sales revenues, that is sales multiplied by the value of money, by
0.7%. In subsequent periods the shadow value of money keeps staying below
steady state because of the autocorrelation in the money growth shock, and
this induces search intensity to decline steadily, too. In the CIA model sales
are equal to consumption which as can be seen in Figure 3b keeps constant
in period 0 since employment and hence production are predetermined.24
Together with the decrease of the value of money this implies that sales
revenues decrease by 1%. Hence employment is even less profitable in the
CIA model than in the Goods Search model. Figures 3c and 3g show how
the difference in sales revenues and profitability of employment across models
23A shock with no persistence would not affect employment at all. But for any ρ = ε
, ε small and positive, e.g. ε = 10-10, we find that the employment reaction of the CIA
model is twice as high as the one of the search-theoretical counterpart.
24Note, that in the CIA model without labor search consumption would decline on
impact. The reason is that agents reduce their real money balances when confronted with
expected inflation. The CIA constraint implies then a reduction in consumption, too.
28
is reflected in the respective drop of vacancies. Vacancies drop less in the
S_L model and hence employment in next period declines less in this model,
too. Finally note, that a decline in employment reduces production. In
the C_L model goods market clearing implies that consumption has to be
equal to production. So the consumption response is proportional to the
employment response, while in the S_L model consumption is proportional
to sales. Qualitatively, the above statements hold for all monetary shocks
with low persistence. For values of ρ > 0.3 the expected inflation effect
starts getting stronger. It dominates the search enhancing effect for highly
persistent shocks. Since there is no expected inflation effect with respect to
the impact response of the value of money in the CIA model, at some value
of ρ the employment responses of the two models have the same magnitude.
For higher values of ρ the negative employment response in the CIA model
becomes smaller than in the goods search model.
To understand the role of Inventory Holdings (I) we compare the
“goods- and labor-search model” (S_L) with the complete model (SIL).
Thus, the only difference is the possibility of storing goods as inventories.
For this purpose consider Figure 4 that shows impulse responses after an
impulse shock (ρ = 0). Let the period where the shock arises again be period
0. Figure 4a indicates that the search intensity rises and the shadow value
of money falls on impact but they reach their respective steady state values
already 1 period after the shock. So there is no persistent effect on search
intensity. In other words the search-enhancing effect on impact is not rein-
forced by any feedback mechanism. Figure 4b shows the quantitative impact
of the higher search intensity and the lower value of money on sales and sales
revenues. The former increase substantially, but not enough to compensate
the loss in the value of money. Thus, changes in sales revenues become neg-
ative on impact. But since sales revenues reach the steady state already in
period 1, and only future sales revenues matter for hiring, there is no impact
on vacancies and hence on employment, as can be seen in Figures 4c and 4d.
In the complete model where firms can hold final goods inventories we have
a different situation. Figure 4e shows that after a monetary shock there is
an increase in search intensity that is slightly larger on impact than in the
model without inventories. The implied increase in sales reduces inventories
held at the beginning of period 1 as can be seen in Figure 4f.
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Define inventory investment in period t as ∆it ≡ it+1 − (1− δi) it. Then
∆i0 = i0 − (1− δi) i∗. Figure 4f indicates that inventory investment drops
in period 0 by 75%. That means that the unsold goods account for only
one quarter of δii∗,25 the necessary investment to maintain the steady state
inventory level. So, if next period’s production level were to be held constant
there would be less supply of goods. In the model with inventories firms would
like to increase production to refill their inventories. Because of costly labor
search this is optimally done in a smooth way. Hence the supply of goods is
below steady state in period 1. Other things being equal this would reduce
sales. However, the reduced supply of goods induces buyers to search more
intensively in period 1, too. The reason is that the consumption smoothing
motive due to risk aversion implies that buyers’ search intensity is a negative
function of the quantity exchanged. The higher search intensity results in a
further increase of the probability of successful matches and implies that sales
drop by less than they would have dropped with steady state search intensity.
This in turn reduces inventories for period 2. This feedback mechanism leads
to the persistence in the response of search intensity and hence in sales. Sales
revenues are affected furthermore by changes in the value of money shown
in Figure 4e. The latter are caused by two effects. First, there is a negative
effect of a monetary shock. Second, a higher search intensity in subsequent
periods increases the value of relaxing the buyers’ cash constraint by holding
an additional unit of money. Since the former effect on the shadow value of
money is not persistent, from period 1 onward the second effect dominates
and the shadow value of money stays for several periods above steady state.
As can be seen in Figure 4f, sales revenues are positive already in period 1 and
hence make inventory investment profitable. Thus, although sales revenues
drop in period 0, firms hire more workers in period 1 to fill up inventories.
Now we can see the key difference between the two models: if goods are not
storable as it is the case in the S_L model there is no effect on the goods
supply in period 1, since unsold goods fully depreciate and the goods supply
in period 1 is equal to production. Hence there is no need to search harder
in subsequent periods and the search enhancing effect arises only on impact.
We can conclude that the possibility of holding inventory is necessary for the
persistent propagation of monetary shocks.
25To see this, note that the percentage deviation from steady state of ∆i0 is given by
∆i0 −∆i∗
∆i∗ =
i0 − i∗ + δii∗ − δii∗
δi∗ = −0.75. This implies i0 = i
∗ − 0.75δii∗ and hence
∆i0 ≡ i0 − (1− δii∗) = 0.25δii∗.
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To find the additional role of Labor Search (L) in the monetary prop-
agation mechanism the complete model of Shi[22] (SIL) is compared to two
versions of the “goods-search and inventory” (SI) model, again with ρ = 0.
Remember that this model differs from Shi’s[22] model only by the absence
of the labor search assumption. Consider first the version where employment
is predetermined. This assumption ensures that a negative impact on sales
revenues due to a feedback of “search-enhancing effect” and “inventory ef-
fect” as contemplated above cannot lead to a reduction of employment and
production in period 0. Figures 5a-5h show the respective impulse responses
for the SI model with predetermined labor and the SIL model. Comparing
Figures 5a and 5b with Figures 5e and 5f we see that the shapes of the impulse
responses of the value of money, the search intensity, inventory investment,
sales and sales revenues are qualitatively similar. Hence the above stated
feedback effect is present also in the model without labor search. Quan-
titatively speaking, among these variables only the volatility of inventory
investment differs substantially across models being larger in the SI model.
In addition the persistence of the responses is smaller in the SI model: they
reach their steady states about 4-5 periods earlier. So, labor search adds
1 year of persistence to the reaction of those variables. The reason is the
following: In the paragraph above we saw that the feedback mechanism be-
tween a “search enhancing effect” and an “inventory effect” induces firms to
hire more workers in period 1. However, if there is no friction in the labor
market and employment can adjust immediately inventories can be refilled
more quickly. Ss can be seen comparing Figures 5b and 5f, inventory invest-
ment in the SI model is larger in subsequent periods until the steady state
is reached and the excess demand is smaller. This, in turn, implies that the
search intensity from period 1 onward is smaller than in the model with labor
search. Hence, the feedback is weaker and the economy shows less persistent
responses.
With respect to employment we see a slightly different picture. Figure 5d
shows that the model without labor search is able to generate an employment
response that stays 8 quarters above steady state. Comparing this with
Figure 5h we find that labor-search prolongs the persistence by more than 8
quarters and in addition has a smoothing effect on employment. The peak
in the employment reaction is more than ten times lower in the model with
labor search and is reached later. This results in a hump shape employment
response. Note also that the overall effect on employment is half as large as
in the model with Walrasian labor markets.
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Finally, labor search also implies that employment is predetermined. To
isolate the effect of this implication Figures 5i-5m show the corresponding
responses of the version of the SI model where firms can decide their em-
ployment level in the current period. The only difference with respect to the
model with predetermined employment is the negative impact reaction of
employment and therefore a higher decrease of inventories and less sales. In
the following periods the households optimal decisions are the same as in the
model with predetermined labor except for inventory investment which ad-
justs endogenously to the implied optimal changes in production and quan-
tity exchanged. Thus, except for inventory investment the responses from
period 1 onward are identical in both model versions. Therefore, the prede-
terminedness of employment decreases volatility in inventories, sales revenue
and employment by the elimination of negative impacts of a monetary shock
to current employment, but increases the volatility of sales.
5 Discussion
The results show that good-search together with inventory holding alone can
generate a substantial propagation mechanism of monetary policy and that
both elements are essential. However, only by introducing labor search one
receives a highly persistent and hump-shaped employment response. The
above analysis suggests that if one is interested in having a model featuring
high persistence, the complete model should be used. In order to see the
direction of the economy’s reaction after a money shock, however, it could
be sufficient to use the model with goods-search and inventories and prede-
termined labor as an approximation of the more complex labor search model.
Changing the timing of the model to a beginning-of-period shock and consid-
ering an autocorrelated monetary shock with an AR(1) parameter ρ = 0.25
the model without labor search features roughly the same overall impact on
employment as the complete model. However, instead of being hump-shaped
the response of employment shows a sharp peak after 3 quarters followed by
a steady decline and the steady state is reached 4 quarters earlier. Unfor-
tunately, there seems to be no way of getting a hump-shaped employment
response without adding some kind of labor market frictions.
An interesting extension is to introduce capital accumulation to study
the joint effects of those propagation mechanisms and to see the models
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implications for consumption, investment and output.26 In a companion
paper, Menner[16], I show that with moderate capital adjustment costs the
search-theoretic feedback mechanism survives and the model‘s implications
are very similar to the model without capital. Moreover, the model can
replicate many US business cycle stylized facts quite well, especially with
respect to sales and inventories. For future research I plan to estimate the
search-theoretic model using Bayesian techniques. This will reveal in which
dimensions the model’s performance differs from the performance of standard
CIA and limited participation models27 and allows to judge whether it is
an appealing alternative as a laboratory for monetary research and policy
evaluation.
Unfortunately, in these search-theoretic models one cannot address ques-
tions of monetary policy as they are usually formulated, since there are no
markets in which a central bank could conduct open-market operations. Up
to now it is only possible to study the effect of helicopter dropping of money.
As Wallace[28] pointed out, money and perfect credit markets cannot coexist
in a model where money is essential since imperfect commitment and imper-
fect memory inhibit credit. And with the lack of perfect commitment and
memory one cannot appeal to the usual equivalence of open-market opera-
tions and lump-sum monetary transfers when there are perfect credit mar-
kets. Hence, the explicit introduction of bank credit and markets for central
bank money is a prerequisite for the examination of central bank policy. By
extending this model to include a market where the central bank can conduct
open-market operations, one could study the effects of monetary policy on
the behavior of the agents in the economy with regard to the holding and
use of fiat money or other means of transaction. Or in other words, the ex-
amination of monetary policy would have a micro-foundation where ’money’
is the asset that actually serves as a means of transaction.28
26Shi[22] studies the effects of search in a neoclassical growth model but does not examine
business cycle fluctuations, neither considers inventory holdings.
27See Nason and Cogley[17] for a comparison of predicted fluctuations of various equi-
librium monetary business cycle models with sample fluctuations of the U.S. business
cycle.
28See the recent work of Faig[6],[5] who advances in this direction using the village
interpretation mentioned in footnote 11. His model has no inventories and he only does
comparative statics analysis.
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A. Existence Proofs
A.1. Goods Search and Inventory Model
Steady state consumption is given by: c∗ = abBzs∗
αq∗. With this, the
FOC with respect to the search intensity and the dynamic equations 34-36
imply the following steady state relations:
c∗ = abBzs∗
α f(n∗)
1− (1− di)(1−Bzs∗α)
, (65)
s∗Φ0 (s∗) = c
∗
abB
[U 0 (c∗)− ω∗] , (66)
ϕ = ef
n∗1−ef
Bzs∗αω∗
(1− β (1− δi) (1−Bzs∗α))
, (67)
zs∗α = γ − ββ
ω∗
U 0 (c∗)− ω∗ , (68)
q∗ = f(n
∗)
1− (1− di)(1−Bzs∗α)
, (69)
ω∗i = β
ϕn∗1−ef
ef
=
βBzs∗αω∗
(1− β (1− δi) (1−Bzs∗α))
. (70)
Equations (69) - (70) give (q∗, ω∗i ) as functions of (c∗, s∗, n∗, ω∗) . Further,
(65) - (68) involve only (c∗, s∗, n∗, ω∗) and can be solved in two blocks. First,
substitute (65) into (66) to solve for s∗ = s (n∗, ω∗). Under the assumption
of a risk aversion parameter RA ≥ 1, the partial derivatives denoted by
subscripts are sω < 0 and sn < 0. This implies that c∗ can be expressed
as c∗ = c (n∗, ω∗) , with cω < 0 and cn > 0. Denote abBs∗Φ0 (s∗) by ξ, then
ξω < 0 and from (66) cω is found to be:
cω =
c∗U 00 (c∗) + U 0 (c∗)− ω∗
ξω + c∗
> c
∗U 00 (c∗) + U 0 (c∗)− ω∗
c∗ ,
which in turn implies that U 0 (c (n∗, ω∗)) /ω∗ is a decreasing function of ω∗.
Substituting s (n∗, ω∗) and c∗ = c (n∗, ω∗) into (67) and (68) gives:
zs (n∗, ω∗)α
µ
U 0 (c (n∗, ω∗))
ω∗ − 1
¶
=
γ
β − 1, (71)
34
0 =
Bzs (n∗, ω∗)α ω∗efn∗
ef−1
(1− β (1− δi) (1−Bzs (n∗, ω∗)α))
− ϕ ≡ F (n∗, ω∗) . (72)
These two equations correspond to equations (3.4) and (3.5) in Shi[22], p.
329ff. The former is identical to (71), the latter equates F (n∗, ω∗) as defined
in (72) to k(v(n∗))1−β(1−δn)σβ . Setting this expression to zero does not alter
the proof in Shi[22]. It works exactly alike with this modification.
Finally it remains to check that these steady state values are consistent
with the assumptions that λ > 0 and ωq > 0 : To see that ω∗q > 0 remember
that the bargaining solution determined ωq as ωq = ω−(1− δi)ωi and notice
that (70) implies ω∗ > ω∗i . To verify λ > 0 it again suffices to check that in the
steady state the nominal interest rate R∗ is positive: R∗ = ωM/βωM 0 − 1 =
gb(s∗)s∗λ/ω∗ = gb(s∗)s∗(U 0 (c∗)− ω∗)/ω∗ = γ−ββ > 0 iff. γ > β. Thus for all
monetary growth rates higher than the ‘Friedman rule’ the considered steady
state exists.
A.2 Goods- and Labor-Search Model
The steady state is given by the following relations:
v∗µ (v∗) = δnn∗, (73)
q∗ = f(n∗) = n∗
ef , (74)
c∗ = abBzs∗
αf(n∗), (75)
s∗Φ0 (s∗) = c
∗
abB
[U 0 (c∗)− ω∗] , (76)
zs∗α = γ − ββ
ω∗
U 0 (c∗)− ω∗ , (77)
k (v∗) (1− β (1− δn))σβ = Bzs
∗αω∗f 0 (n∗)− ϕ. (78)
Expressions (73) and (74) give v∗ and q∗as increasing functions of n∗.
Hence, (75)-(78) involve only (c∗, s∗, ω∗, n∗). Now it is possible to further
reduce the system to one equation. First, substituting (75) into (76) gives:
s∗1−αΦ0 (s∗) = zn∗
ef
h
U 0
³
apBzs∗
αn∗
ef
´
− ω∗
i
. (79)
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This defines s as a function of n∗ and ω∗: s∗ = s(ω∗, n∗). Under the
assumption RA ≥ 1 this function is decreasing in both arguments: sω∗ < 0
and sn∗ < 0. With this one can show that c∗ = c(ω∗, n∗), with cω∗ < 0 and
cn∗ > 0. Equations (77) and (78) can then be rewritten as:
zs(ω∗, n∗)α
µ
U 0 (c(ω∗, n∗))
ω∗ − 1
¶
=
γ
β − 1, (80)
k (v∗) (1− β (1− δn))σβ = Bzs(ω
∗, n∗)αω∗f 0 (n∗)− ϕ ≡ FB (ω∗, n∗) . (81)
Denote the relation between ω∗ and n∗ described in (80) by n∗ = n1(ω∗),
and the other given through (81) by n∗ = n2(ω∗). The steady state value ω∗
is then the one that solves n1(ω∗) = n2(ω∗).
Similar to the existence proof in Appendix A.1, it is true that U 0 (c(ω∗, n∗)) /ω∗
is a decreasing function of ω∗. Now the proof of existence continues as in Shi
[22], p.330, using (81) instead of (3.5) with one exception: to show that
n2(0) = 0 we have to deviate from the first part of the proof of his LEMMA
3.3 which can be found in his Appendix A.2:
To show n2(0) = 0, note that since sn∗ < 0, it holds that
s(ω, N¯ (ω)) ≤ s(ω, n2 (ω)), ∀ N¯ (ω) ≤ n2 (ω) .
For any ω, fix a N¯ (ω) ≤ n2 (ω) . Since sω∗ < 0 it is also true that s(ω, N¯ (ω)) ≤
s(0, N¯ (ω)). Then
f 0 (n2 (ω)) =
ϕ+ k (v (n2 (ω))) (1−β(1−δn))σβ
Bzs(ω, n2 (ω))αω ≥
ϕ+ k
¡
v
¡
N¯ (ω)
¢¢
(1−β(1−δn))
σβ
Bzs(ω, N¯ (ω))αω
≥
ϕ+ k
¡
v
¡
N¯ (ω)
¢¢
(1−β(1−δn))
σβ
Bzs(0, N¯ (ω))αω
.
Taking the limit ω → 0, of both sides of the resulting inequality one gets:
lim
ω→0
f 0 (n2 (ω)) = lim
ω→0
½
ϕ
Bzs(0, N¯ (ω))α
1
ω
¾
=
ϕ
Bz ·
1
0
· 1
0
=∞.
The characteristics of the production function thus imply n2 (0) = 0. The
rest of the proof of LEMMA 3.3 in Shi[22] applies also for this model.
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To see that these steady state values are consistent with the assumptions
that λ > 0 and ωq > 0 it suffices to check, that in the steady state the
nominal interest rate R∗ and the shadow value of money ω∗ are positive:
Expression (81) implies that ω∗ > 0. The nominal interest rate is determined
as before as γ−ββ . Thus, again,for all monetary growth rates higher then the
Friedman rule the considered steady state exists.
A.3 CIA Model with Labor-Search
The steady state is given by the following equations:
W ∗ = σϕω∗ + (1− σ) f
0 (n∗) , (82)
v∗µ (v∗) = δnn∗, (83)
c∗ = apf(n∗), (84)
U 0 (c(n∗))
ω∗ =
γ
β , (85)
k (v (n∗)) (1− β (1− δn))
σβ = ω
∗f 0 (n∗)− ϕ ≡ Fc(n∗, ω∗). (86)
Since c∗ does not depend on ω∗, U
0(c(n∗))
ω∗ is a decreasing function in ω
∗.
Expressions (85) and (86) are the equivalents to equations (3.4) and (3.5)
in the existence proof in Shi. They give again relations between n∗and ω∗,
denoted in analogy to Shi as n1c (ω∗) and n2c (ω∗) . We now examine the
properties of the two curves. First, we proof that the properties shown in
Lemma 3.2 in Shi[22] for n1 (ω∗) hold as well for n1c (ω∗): The left hand side
of equation (85) is also a decreasing function in ω∗. Thus it also holds that
n10c (ω∗) < 0. Next it is to show that as well n1c (0) = ∞ and n1c (∞) = 0.
From (85) it follows that U 0(c(n1c (0))) = γβ · 0 = 0. The assumptions on the
utility function, however, imply that U 0(c (n1c (ω∗))) → 0 as ω∗ → 0 only if
c (n1c (ω∗)) → ∞, which in turn only happens if n1c (ω∗) → ∞. A similar
argument holds for n1c (∞) = 0.
In contrast to n2 (ω∗) , n2c (ω∗) is monotonically increasing. To show
n2c (0) = 0, note that (86) implies
f 0 (n2 (ω∗)) = 1ω∗
·
ϕ+ k (v (n2 (ω
∗))) (1− β (1− δn))
σβ
¸
> ϕω∗ .
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Hence, f 0 (n2 (0)) =∞ and therefore n2 (0) = 0. These properties of n1c (ω∗)
and n2c (ω∗) imply a unique intersection n∗.
Finally one has to check that this intersection is consistent with the as-
sumption that the CIA is non-binding, that means λ > 0, which is implied
by a money growth rate higher than the Friedman rule. Choose a arbitrarily
small ∆ > 0. The solution must then satisfy U 0(c(n∗)) ≥ ω∗ + ∆ in order
to ensure λ > 0. That means n∗ has to be smaller or equal to a number
N(ω∗,∆) which is defined by U 0(c(N(ω∗,∆))) = ω∗ +∆.
Consider first the intersection between n1c (ω∗) and N(ω∗,∆) : By the
definition ofN(ω∗,∆) it follows U 0(c) = ω+∆which leads to c = U 0−1 (ω +∆) .
Expression (85) which defines n1c (ω∗) implies:
ω +∆
ω =
γ
β ,
∆ = γ − ββ ω.
Thus n1c (ω∗) and N(ω∗,∆) intersect at:
ω1 (∆) = βγ − β∆, ω1∆ > 0.
For γ > β it holds that:
lim
∆→0
ω1 (∆) = 0.
Now look at the intersection between n2c (ω∗) and N(ω∗,∆):
The latter implies ω = U 0(c(n∗))−∆, and expression (84) gives:
n(c) ≡ f−1
µ
c
ap
¶
, nc > 0,
which can be substituted into (86):
1
f 0 (n(c))
·
ϕ+ k (v (n(c))) (1− β (1− δn))σβ
¸
= [U 0(c))−∆] . (87)
The left hand side is an increasing function of c, the right hand side is
decreasing in c. Furthermore LHS(87)|c=0= 0 < ∞ = RHS(87)|c=0 and
LHS(87)|c=∞= ∞ > 0 = RHS(87)|c=∞ . Thus the solution for c is unique
and independent of ∆. Hence ω2 (∆) = U 0(c)−∆ and ω2 (0) = U 0(c). That
means that n2c (ω) intersects N(ω, 0) at ω2 (0) = U 0(c).
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Putting things together we have that ω1 (0) = 0 < U 0(apf(n∗)) = ω2 (0) .
Since ω1 (∆) is increasing in ∆ and ω2 (∆) is decreasing in ∆, there exists a
∆∗ > 0 such that ω1 (∆∗) = ω2 (∆∗) . Therefore, n∗ = N(ω∗,∆∗) and λ > 0.
Thus, the equilibrium is consistent with the assumed money growth rate.
B. Calibration
Since the calibration of the complete search-theoretic monetary model
is documented in Shi’s[22] I do not replicate it here. For the other models
some modifications of his calibration strategy are necessary. In the following
subsections I describe the choice of the parameter values and the implied
steady state values of the variables. All exogenously chosen values are the
same as in Shi[22].
B.1. Goods Search and Inventory Model
Interpreting the length of a period as a quarter, the value for the discount
factor β of 0.99 implies an annual real interest rate of four percent. The
steady state growth rate of money is set to γ∗ = 1.012 to match the average
quarterly inflation rate in postwar US data. See the text for the specification
of the AR(1) coefficient of the shock to the money growth rate.
The steady state labor force is normalized to n∗ = 100. To specify the
cardinality of the set of producers ap, Shi[22] sets the active labor force
ap(n∗+1) to 0.7.29 The unemployment rate u/(ap(n∗+1)+u) is set to 0.06.
This leads to u = 0.0447 and implies a value for ap of 0.0069.
The elasticity in the matching function of buyers and sellers α is arbitrar-
ily set to 0.8. The buyers/sellers ratio B and the goods search matching pa-
rameter z are determined jointly with the inventory depreciation rate δi. The
steady state inventory/output ratio and the inventory investment/output ra-
tio are set to their quarterly averages in postwar US data, that is, i∗/f (n∗) =
0.9, δii∗/f (n∗) = 0.0065. Thus, δi = 0.0065/0.9 = 0.0072. Setting the quar-
terly income velocity of money to 1, one gets a relation determining B:
apf (n∗)P
M =
apf (n∗)
abq∗
=
apf (n∗)
ab(f (n∗) + i∗)
=
ap
ab
1
1.9 =
1
1.9 ·B = 1.
29Note, that in the paper Shi wrote that he set the labor participation rate ap(n∗ +
1) + u to 0.7, but inspection of his program revealed that he used the active labor force
instead.
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Thus, B = 1/1.9 = 0.5263. With these values we can calculate z and hence
q∗ :
z = B − δi
(1− δi)Bs∗α
,
q∗ = f (n
∗)
1− (1− δi)(1−Bzs∗α)
.
Shi[22] sets shopping time as 11.16% of working time and the latter as 30%
of agents discretionary time. Hence, s∗ = 0.1116 ∗ 0.3(n∗ + 1)/B = 6. 4248
and z is determined.30 Assuming a labor income share LIS = W ∗n∗/f (n∗)
of 0.64, the value of the production parameter ef can be computed from (67)
and (28):
ϕ = W ∗ω∗ = n∗
ef−1LISω∗ = ef
n∗1−ef
Bzs∗αω∗
(1− β (1− δi) (1−Bzs∗α))
,
ef = LIS
1− β(1− δi) ∗ (1−Bzs∗α)
Bzs∗α = 0.64088 .
This differs slightly from the value of ef = 0.6804 for the model with labor
search.
In the absence of capital formation and investment the implied consump-
tion/output ratio is not realistic. To incorporate expenditure on fixed invest-
ment, assume that fixed investment is a constant fraction, FIk, of aggregate
sales. Since the latter are exogenous to the households this is just a subtrac-
tion of a lump sum from each household’s consumption. Thus the optimal
choices remain the same and the equilibrium conditions continue to hold with
the modification that ct = (1−FIk)abBzsαt qt. Shi[22] sets the steady state ex-
penditure on fixed investment to 26.9% of output: FIkBzs∗
αq∗ = 0.269f (n∗),
which defines FIk.
The parameter ϕ is given by (67):
ϕ = efβn∗1−ef
βBzs∗αω∗
(1− β (1− δi) (1−Bzs∗α))
,
once ω∗ is determined. Combining (68) and (69) leads to
(c∗)−2 zs∗α =
µ
zs∗α + γ − ββ
¶
ω∗,
30Note, that in Shi[22] the fraction of shopping time to working time is misreported as
11.6%. Moreover, B times the value of z is incorrectly reported to be the value of z.
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and thus:
ω∗ = zs
∗α
c∗2
³
γ−β
β + zs∗α
´ .
Finally it remains to specify the disutility of search: Shi[22] uses Φ (s) =
ϕ (ϕ0s)
1+1/eΦ where ϕ0 is the efficiency of a buyer’s search intensity relative
to a worker’s time. Shi[22] assumes that shopping has a higher elasticity than
labor supply and sets eΦ = 2. Plugging (68) and (69) into (66) one gets:
ϕ0 =
µ
γ − β
β
f(n∗)ω∗
(1− (1− di)(1−Bzs∗α))ϕs1+1/eΦ (1 + 1/eΦ)
¶ eΦeΦ+1
.
B.2. Goods- and Labor Search Model
In addition to the parameters in the inventory model, the job separation
rate δn and the exponent of the labor matching function A have to be spec-
ified. I use Shi’s[22] value of 0.06 and 0.6, respectively. The values for u and
ap remain unchanged.
To determine B and z I have to depart once again from Shi’s[22] cali-
bration procedure, since there are no inventories. In line with Shi[22] the
quarterly income velocity of money is set to 1:
apf ∗P
M =
apf∗
abq∗
=
apf ∗
abf ∗
=
ap
ab
= 1.
Thus, B = ab/ap = 1. Again, shopping time is assumed to be 11.16% of
working time and the latter to be 30% of agents discretionary time. Thus,
s∗ = 0.1116∗0.3(n∗+1)/B = 6. 4248. Setting the labor income share to 0.64,
i.e. W ∗n∗/f = 0.64, it follows: W ∗ = 0.64f/n∗. In addition assume that the
hiring cost is 2% of the labor cost: K0v∗
2/(ω∗W ∗n∗) = 0.02. Expression (51)
implies:
W ∗ = σ ϕω∗ + (1− σ) zBs
∗αefn∗
(ef−1),
which leads to a value for ϕ of
ϕ =
µ
0.64
ef
− (1− σ) zBs∗α
¶
f 0(n∗)ω∗
σ , (88)
to be plugged in (78) :
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2 ∗ 0.020.64ef
n∗
³ap
u
´A−1
(v∗)A−2 (1− β (1− δn))β = Bzs
∗α − 0.64ef
.
Hence, z is determined by
z =
µ
0.04n∗
³ap
u
´A−1
(v∗)A−2 (1− β (1− δn))β + 1
¶
0.64
efBs∗α
, (89)
once ef and v∗ are calibrated. Equation (73) implies with the choice of
A = 0.6 a value for v∗ of:
v∗ = 6 10.6
µ
0.7
101 ∗ 0.442
¶ 0.4
0.6
= 1. 2411 .
The coefficient ef is now a free parameter. It is chosen in each model com-
parison to match the value of ef in the compared model.
The fraction of fixed capital investment relative to sales is now: FIk =
0.269f/(Bzs∗αq) = 0.269/Bzs∗α and this implies steady state consumption
of c∗ = (1− FIk)abBzsαt qt. The steady state value of ω can be calculated by
(77) and assuming again a utility function of the CRRA-type with a relative
risk aversion of RA = 2. Therefore U 0(c) = c−2, and one gets:
ω∗ = zs
∗α
(zs∗α + γ−ββ )(a2pf∗
2(zBs∗α − 0.269)2)
.
K0 is given by
K0 = 0.02 ∗ 0.64f (n∗)ω∗v∗
−2,
and ϕ can be calculated by (88):
ϕ =
µ
0.64
ef
− (1− σ) zBs∗α
¶
f 0(n∗)ω∗
σ . (90)
Finally one receives a value for ϕ0 setting eΦ = 2 and plugging (77) into (76):
ϕ0 =
γ − β
β
f(n∗)ω∗
(ϕs1+1/eΦ (1 + 1/eΦ))
eΦ
eΦ+1
.
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B.3. CIA and Labor Search Model
Expression (83) implies a value for v∗ of:
v∗ = 6 10.6
µ
0.7
101 ∗ 0.442
¶ 0.4
0.6
= 1. 2411 .
Substituting the steady state expression for ϕ, (82), into (86) and using again
the formulas corresponding to the labor income share and to hiring costs one
gets:
k (v∗) (1− β (1− δn)) = σω∗f 0 (n∗) + (1− σ)ω∗f 0 (n∗)−W ∗ω∗,
2∗0.02∗0.64f (n
∗)
n∗ ω
∗n∗
³ap
u
´A−1
(v∗)A−2 (1− β (1− δn)) = (ef − 0.64)
f (n∗)
n∗ ω
∗.
This implies:
ef = 0.64
µ
0.04n∗
³ap
u
´A−1
(v∗)A−2 (1− β (1− δn)) + 1
¶
.
Now, ϕ and K0 are determined by:
ϕ = (0.64− (1− σ) ef)ω∗
f (n∗)
n∗σ , and K0 = 0.02 ∗ 0.64f (n
∗)ω∗v∗−2 .
Finally, c∗and ω∗ are given by
c∗ = (1− FIk)apf(n∗), and ω∗ =
βU 0 (c∗)
γ .
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C. Tables
Table 1 Calibration to Intervals
Parameter
Point
Calibration
Empirical Density
ρg {0, 0.4, 0.85}
σg 0.1078
β 0.99 truncated Normal(0.9926, 1)
[0.9855− 1.001]
γ 1.012 truncated Normal(1.0120, 1)
[1.002− 1.022]
RA 2 truncated χ
2(4)
[0.25− 3.25], mode at 2
eΦ 2 uniform [1− 3]
α 0.8 uniform [0.5− 1]
σ 0.7 uniform [0.5− 1] ∗)
δn 0.06 uniform [0.04− 0.08]
A 0.6 uniform [0.4− 0.8]
%. of unemployed 0.06 uniform [0.04− 0.08]
Labor participation rate 0.6 uniform [0.55− 0.65]
Labor income share 0.64 uniform [0.5− 0.75] ∗)
Shopping time / Working time 0.11166456 uniform [0.05− 0.15] ∗)
Fraction of Working time 0.3 uniform [0.25− 0.35]
Fixed investment/output 0.269 uniform [0.26− 0.28] ∗)
Inventories/output 0.9 uniform [0.8− 1]
Inventory investment/output 0.0065 uniform [0.006− 0.007]
‘Point Calibration’ refers to the calibrated values used by Shi [22]. ‘Empirical
Density’ refers to constructed parameter distributions using either existing
estimates or a-priori intervals as in Canova [3].
∗) indicates that the distribution is not centered around Shi’s [22] value. See
Section 1.3.1 for a discussion.
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Table 2 Simulated Parameter Values
Parameter Point Calibration Mean 90% - Interval
β 0.99 0.9941 0.9870− 1.0011
γ 1.012 1.0117 1.0032− 1.0207
RA 2 1.9195 0.5262− 3.1201
FIk 0.2708 0.2716 0.2627− 0.2808
B 0.5263 0.5279 0.5022− 0.5535
z 0.2242 0.3017 0.1369− 0.4579
δn 0.06 0.0599 0.0424− 0.0786
A 0.6 0.6021 0.4255− 0.7818
σ 0.7 0.7443 0.5318− 0.9734
u 0.0447 0.0427 0.0310− 0.0577
ap 0.0069 0.0069 0.0065− 0.0074
ef 0.6804 0.7888 0.6698− 0.9096
δi 0.0072 0.0073 0.0064− 0.0083
ϕ 10.603 17.3748 0.7420− 80.851
ϕ0 0.4332 0.4033 0.1498− 0.7889
eΦ 2 1.9545 1.1247− 2.7867
α 0.8 0.7501 0.5174− 0.9720
K0 0.6615 1.5431 0.0315− 5.9362
Result of the calibration to intervals: Parameter values obtained by N = 250
random draws from the empirical distributions as specified in Table 1.
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Figures Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 1 : Pointwise Error Bands: SIL Model
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Pointwise error bands are the 95% error bands of the impulse responses for
each point in time after the monetary shock. See Section 1.3.2 for a detailled
explanation. SIL stands for the complete model with the elements Goods-
Search (S), Inventories (I), and Labor-Search (L). The autocorrelation of the
monetary shock is ρ = 0. Number of parameter draws: 250.
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Figure 1 : continued
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Pointwise error bands are the 95% error bands of the impulse responses for
each point in time after the monetary shock. See Section 1.3.2 for a detailled
explanation. SIL stands for the complete model with the elements Goods-
Search (S), Inventories (I), and Labor-Search (L). The autocorrelation of the
monetary shock is ρ = 0. Number of parameter draws: 250.
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Figure 2 : Probabilitiy Bands of Principle Components: SIL
Model
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95% probability bands are constructed by the respective 2.5% and 97.5%
quantiles of the projection on the principle components of the covariance
matrix of the jointly distributed impulse response vector after a monetary
shock. See Section 1.3.2 for a detailled explanation. SIL stands for the
complete model with the elements Goods-Search (S), Inventories (I), and
Labor-Search (L). The autocorrelation of the monetary shock has the value
ρ = 0. Number of parameter draws: 250.
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Figures Role of Goods-Search
Figure 3 a) - d): Impulse Responses: C_L Model
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Impulse responses after a monetary shock with autocorrelation ρ = 0.2. C_L
stands for the Cash-in-Advance model (C) with Labor-Search (L). Note, in
the following, the responses of consumption, sales and sales-revenue are mul-
tiplied by 100 for easier comparison with the response of inventory investment
in the complete model.
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Figure 3 e) - h): Impulse Responses: S_L Model
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Impulse responses after a monetary shock with autocorrelation ρ = 0.2. S_L
stands for the Goods-Search model (S) with Labor-Search (L). Note, the re-
sponses of sales and sales-revenue are multiplied by 100 for easier comparison
with the response of inventory investment in the complete model.
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Figures Role of Inventories
Figure 4 a) - d): Impulse Responses: S_L Model
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Impulse responses after a monetary shock with autocorrelation ρ = 0. S_L
stands for the model with Goods-Search (S) and Labor-Search (L). Note, the
responses of sales and sales-revenue are multiplied by 100 for easier compar-
ison with the response of inventory investment in the complete model.
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Figure 4 e) - h): Impulse Responses: SIL Model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
%
 
de
v.
 
fro
m
 
st
e
a
dy
 
st
a
te
Quarters after shock
e
search-intensity
shadow-value-of-money
money-growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-100
-50
0
50
%
 
de
v.
 
fro
m
 
st
e
a
dy
 
st
a
te
Quarters after shock
f
sales-revenue (x 100)
sales (x 100)
inventory-investment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
%
 
de
v.
 
fro
m
 
st
e
a
dy
 
st
a
te
Quarters after shock
g
vacancies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
%
 
de
v.
 
fro
m
 
st
e
a
dy
 
st
a
te
Quarters after shock
h
employment
Impulse responses after a monetary shock with autocorrelation ρ = 0. SIL
stands for the complete model with the elements Goods-Search (S), Invento-
ries (I) and Labor-Search (L). Note, the responses of sales and sales-revenue
are multiplied by 100 for easier comparison with the response of inventory
investment.
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Figures Role of Labor-Search
Figure 5 a) - d): Impulse Responses: SI Model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
%
 
de
v.
 
fro
m
 
st
e
a
dy
 
st
a
te
Quarters after shock
a
search-intensity
shadow-value-of-money
money-growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-100
-50
0
50
%
 
de
v.
 
fro
m
 
st
e
a
dy
 
st
a
te
Quarters after shock
b
inventory-investment
sales-revenue (x 100)
sales (x 100)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
%
 
de
v.
 
fro
m
 
st
e
a
dy
 
st
a
te
Quarters after shock
c
search-intensity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
%
 
de
v.
 
fro
m
 
st
e
a
dy
 
st
a
te
Quarters after shock
d
employment
Impulse responses after a monetary shock with autocorrelation ρ = 0. SI
stands for the model with Goods-Search (S) and Inventories (I). In period
t agents choose employment in t + 1, nt+1. Therefore nt is predetermined.
Note, the responses of sales and sales-revenue are multiplied by 100 for easier
comparison with the response of inventory investment.
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Figure 5 e) - h): Impulse Responses: SIL Model
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Impulse responses after a monetary shock with autocorrelation ρ = 0. SIL
stands for the complete model with the elements Goods-Search (S), Invento-
ries (I) and Labor-Search (L). Note, the responses of sales and sales-revenue
are multiplied by 100 for easier comparison with the response of inventory
investment.
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Figure 5 i) - m): SI Model (nt not predetermined)
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Impulse responses after a monetary shock with autocorrelation ρ = 0. SI
stands for the model with Goods-Search (S) and Inventories (I). Here, em-
ployment of period t, nt, is chosen in period t. Hence nt is not predetermined.
Note, the responses of sales and sales-revenue are multiplied by 100 for easier
comparison with the response of inventory investment.
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